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ABSTRACT
In the twenty-first century many of the professional and high ranking managerial workers in
the United States and in other OECD countries will be women. This change in women’s social and
economic status represents a dramatic break with the past, but one that can only be understood by
looking to the past. The rise of the career woman would not have been possible without the entry of
previous generations of women into the labor market. This entry was determined both by
contemporaneous demand factors and by the characteristics, expectations, and social norms
regarding work and family of different cohorts of women. History suggests that change in women’s
labor force experiences may be slow because it must await the entry of new cohorts of women (and
also of men)into the labor market.
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in theUnited Statesand in other OECD countries will be women. At theend of the 1990s women
earned 55 percent of all bachelor’s degrees and 40 percent of all doctoral degrees (National
Science Foundation 1999). They represented over 40 percent of all graduates from medical and
law schools (American Medical Association; American Bar Association). The entry of women
into “careers,” that is work that requires a lengthy period of training and that offers promotions,
represents a fundamental break with the past. In 1970 only 14 percent of all doctoral degrees
were awarded to women, only 8 percent of all students enrolled in law schools were women, and
only 8 percent of all medical school graduates were women (National Science Foundation 1999;
American Medical Association; American Bar Association). Those women who had careers
were primarily involved in teaching. If we go back even further in time to 1930 or 1940, married
women had neither careers nor jobs. They rarely participated in the labor force. The unmarried
did participate (though at much lower rates than they do today) but had little hope for promotion
to higher paying jobs.
This dramatic change in women’s social and economic status can only be understood
by looking to the past. Each generation of women set the stage for the next. The rise of thecareer
woman would not have been possible without the prior entry of married women into the labor
force, even though this entry was primarily in dead-end jobs in the clerical sector. The unmarried
ofﬁce girl in turn paved the way for the entry of married women into the clerical sector and into
the labor force. Finally, the ofﬁcegirl may never have existed but for the factory girl of an earlier
generation.
This essay surveys the growth in women’s labor force participation. In the past the gulf
between the labor force participation of men and women was large. In the United States only 20
percent of all women older than 15 worked for pay in 1900. Less than 6 percent of all married
women older than 15 labored for pay. By the century’s end the gap in men and women’s labor
1force participation rates had narrowed considerably in many countries. In the United States the
labor forceparticipationof all womenolder than16 hadrisen to60percent andthat of all married
women older than 16 to 62 percent.1
This increase in women’s paid work since the beginning of the twentieth century has
had enormous social and political signiﬁcance. Increased retirement has decreased the paid
labor of older men and increased education has reduced the paid labor of the young. The
one major countervailing trend in the twentieth century has been the increased participation of
women. Goldin (1986) estimates that their greater participation across the twentieth century
has increased the aggregate labor force participation rate of 25 to 44 year olds by about 50
percent. Women’s greater participation has led to the growth of market substitutes for such
home-produced goods as food and clothing. Their greater work for pay has altered the power
relationships between husbands and wives, has inﬂuenced family formation and dissolution, and
has affected the distribution of resources within the family (Lundberg and Pollack 1996). In a
study of working class families, a husband complained that his wife “doesn’t know how to give
respect ... Because she’s working and making money, she thinks she can argue back whenever
she feels like it” (cited in Goldin 1990: 11).
Wehavenotyetseenthefullsocialandpoliticalimpactoftheriseinwomen’spaidlabor,
becausethemorefundamentalchangescomefromwomen’sentryintocareersandthisentryisstill
a relatively recent phenomenon. Work for money, regardless of type of work, generates different
attitudes and relationships among family members. Two careers, by bringing true equality into
marriage, generate yet another set of attitudes and relationships between husband and wife. The
increased importancethat both husbands and wives attach to her career has been felt in all sectors
of the economy. The rise of dual career households has beneﬁted large metropolitan areas and
1See Figure 1 and Table 1 later in the text.
2has hurt the ability of smaller cities to attract highly skilled individuals because these individuals
are increasingly bundled with an equally skilled spouse and need the larger labor marketsoffered
by larger metropolitan areas to solve their colocation problem (Costa and Kahn, forthcoming).
Because since the 1960s labor force participation rates have increased fastest among the wives of
college educated men (Juhn and Murphy 1997), the rise of the dual career household has affected
household income inequality. The increased supply of professional women has beneﬁted ﬁrms
needing highly skilled workers but women’s expanding career opportunities have hurt such as
education that traditionally depended upon women’s labor (Flyer and Rosen 1997).
This essay begins witha descriptionof trendsinwomen’slabor forceparticipationrates
in the United States, France, and Great Britain over more than 100 years.2 It examines the types
of jobs womenheldand the lifecycleof paid workin theUnited States over the last twocenturies.
It also describes trends in several OECD countries since 1960. In some countries women’s
participation rates have barely changed since the 1960s whereas in others the growth in women’s
participation has been dramatic. In those countries where women’slabor forceparticipation rates
have risen since the 1960s (and the United States is among these), they have risen because of the
growthin theparticipationof marriedwomen. This essay thenexamines whyin theUnitedStates
married women have increased their participation. It concludes with a look towards the future.
2Notallcountries can be examined in a shortreview essay. Britainand France present twoextreme cases because
Britain was highly industrializedwhereas a large proportionof France’s populationworked in agriculture.
31 Trends
1.1 Long-run Participation Rates
The history of women’s participation in market work is complicated by issues of measurement.
Thelaborforceconceptisfraughtwithambiguities. IntheUnitedStatespriorto1940onlywomen
who reported a usual occupation were considered to be “gainfully employed” and therefore
enumerated as being in the labor force. Beginning in 1940 the deﬁnition of the labor force
changed to include all individuals working for pay, unpaid family workers, and the unemployed
seeking work during the survey week. These differences in deﬁnition are unlikely to affect the
enumeration of the adult male labor force, but will affect the enumeration of female labor at a
timewhen many womenworkedas unpaidfarmwives, as boardinghousekeepers, oras industrial
home workers. Although consistency over time suggests that these women should be included in
the deﬁnitionof the labor force, their exclusion does not affect the measurement of women’spaid
work outside of the home.
Figure 1 shows the growth in women’s labor force participation rates in the United
States. In 1890 only 18 percent of women worked for pay and by 1930 only 26 percent. By 1998
the ﬁgure was 60 percent. Most of the growth prior to 1940 was in the labor force participation
of white women. Rates for black women were constant at about 43 percent prior to 1940, fell
during the depression, and then began their modern rise. Participation rates were traditionally
higher for black than for white women because black incomes were lower and because the legacy
of slavery may have made paid work less socially stigmatized among black than among white
married women (Goldin 1977). Because women’s work was undercounted, Figure 1 overstates
the nineteenth and early twentieth century increase in women’s economic activity rates (but not
the increase in their paid work outside of the home).
Figure 2 shows labor force participation rates in Great Britain and France. In Great
4Figure 1: Labor Force Participation Rates by Race, United States, 1870-1999
Note. Participation rates for 1870-1960 are for women age older than 14. Participation rates for 1970-1999 are for
women older than 15. Rates for 1890-1980 are from Goldin (1990: 17). Rates for 1870 and 1880 were estimated
from the integrated public use micro census samples (Ruggles and Sobeck 1998). Rates for 1990 and 1999 are from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics web site.
5Britain women’s participation rates dipped from 37 percent in 1881 to 34 percent in 1921 before
rising to 37 percent again in 1961. By 1998 participation rates were 53 percent. French
participation rates were higher than the British until about 1961. French rates trended upwards
during the nineteenth century to reach a peak of 48 percent in 1911, declined in the ﬁrst half
of the twentieth century, and then rose beginning in the 1960s. French participation rates may
have been higher than the British because French agricultureemployed many women and France
industrialized only very slowly. France may also not have developed the male breadwinner
ideology associated in Britain with industrialization (Marchand and Th´ elot 1991; Humphries and
Horrocks 1995). As in the American case, British and French labor force participation rates prior
to the second half of the twentieth century are probably understated because they undercount
employment in family enterprises and casual labor (Higgs 1987; Grantham and Grimard 1999).
Joshi and Owen (1987) argue that even later censuses do not fully enumerate married women
working only a few hours a week and that the rise in women’s participation rates after 1951 may
be overstated.
In both the United States and in Great Britain the biggest increase in participation rates
in the twentieth century has been for married women and in both countries most of the increase
was after 1940 (see Table 1).3 Among British women of working age, the participation rate
of non-married women was roughly constant between 1911 and 1998 whereas that of married
woman hovered at about 10 percent between 1911 and 1931 but by 1998 surpassed that of not
married women. In the United States the labor force participation rate of single women older
than 15 or 16 rose from 41 to 51 percent between 1890 and 1970 and then to 68 percent in 1998.
3Although World War II is often credited with changing attitudes towards working women, the direct impact of
the war was small. The majorityof women whoentered the labor force duringthe war exited it after the war (Goldin
1991). Finegan and Margo (1994) argue that in the 1930s married women were very unresponsive to short-run
movements in aggregate demand but that their responsiveness to sustained increases in aggregate demand, such as
that duringWorld War II, was quitelarge.
6Figure 2: Labor Force Participation Rates in Great Britain and France
Note. French participationrates for1820-1990are fromMarchand and Th´ elot(1991: 175). The French participation
ratefor1995isfromtheINSEEweb site. Britishparticipationratesfor1891-1961arefromMatthews, Feinstein,and
Odling-Smee(1982: 563-565). Thosefor1971-1998arefromtheOfﬁceforNationalStatisticswebsite. Participation
rates for 1891-1971are for ages older than 14 and those for 1981-1998 are for ages older than 15.
7Table 1: Labor Force Participation Rates by Marital Status, United States and Great Britain
United States Great Britain
Age Year Married Single Age Year Married Unmarried
15+ 1880 4.6 37.6
1890 4.6 40.5
1900 5.6 43.5
15-64 1911 9.9 66.0
1920 9.0 46.4 1921 9.0 67.0
1930 11.7 50.5 1931 10.6 69.6
1940 13.8 45.5
1950 21.6 50.6 1951 23.6 72.3
1960 30.6 47.5 1961 32.6 71.8
16+ 1970 39.5 51.0 1973 48.2 62.3
1980 50.1 61.5 16-59 1981 60.0 75.0
1990 57.6 66.4 1990 71.0 71.0
1998 61.8 68.1 1998 74.0 67.0
The United States ﬁgure for 1880 is compiled from the 1880 micro-census sample (Ruggles and Sobeck
1998). No ﬁgure is given for 1910 because this census enumerated unpaid family workers and is therefore
not consistent with the others. Those for 1890-1900 and for 1920-1980 are from Goldin (1990: 17). Those
for 1998 are from Handbook of U.S. Labor Statistics (1999). The numbers for Great Britain for 1911-1973
are from Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling-Smee (1982: 563-565). The ﬁgures for 1981 and 1990 are from
graphs in various issues of Social Trends and are therefore not precisely calculated. The numbers for 1990
and for 1998 are for married/cohabitating and not married/not cohabitating. The 1998 ﬁgures are from the
Ofﬁce for NationalStatisticswebsite. Note that onlyprime-age groups are examined inGreat Britainso rates
cannot be compared across countries.
The participation rate of married women in the same age group was less than 5 percent at the end
of the nineteenth century and by 1940 was still only 14 percent. Between 1950 and 1998 it rose
from 22 to 62 percent, with particularly large increases between 1950 and 1980 when married
women’sparticipationratesroseby9 to10 percentagepointsin each decade. Incontrast,between
1980 and 1990 participation rates rose by 8 percentage points and between 1990 and 1998 by 4
percentage points. The time trend among black women is similar, but participation rates were
initially higher for married women (Goldin 1990: 17).
Although the labor force participation rates give in Table 1 are not comparable across
8countries because different age groups are presented, participation rates of married women have
always been very similar in Britain and in the United States while those of single women have
differed. In both the United States and in Great Britain labor force participation rates of married
womenolderthan15were9percentcirca1920and22percentcirca1950. In1998theparticipation
rates of married women age 16 to 59 were 73 percent in the United States and 74 percent in
Great Britain. In the United States participation rates increased for single women and increased
despite the rise in years attending school. The same increase in unmarried women’s labor force
participation rates is not observed in Britain because unmarried women’s participation rates were
high even at the beginning of the century. Around 1920 62 percent of unmarried British women
over the age of 15 were in the labor force compared to 46 percent of American women in the
same age group. By 1998 the participation rate of unmarried American women exceeded that of
unmarried British women. Among unmarriedwomen between 16 and 59 years of age 74 percent
of Americans were in the labor force compared to 67 percent of Britons.
Women’s participation in market work has followed a different pattern from women’s
work for pay outside the home (documented in the ﬁgures and the table). Goldin (1995) argues
that women’s labor force participation, when measured to include unpaid family workers, is U-
shaped. When incomesarelowwomenarein thelaborforceas unpaidworkersin familyfarmsor
businesses. As incomes rise their participation ﬁrst falls and then rises only as their educational
levels grow and their market work becomes more valuable than their household work. This
U-shape is observed in the past. Correcting the 1890 United States ﬁgures for married women’s
participation ratesto account for unpaid family farmworkersand boarding house keepersimplies
that married women’s activity rates were a full 10 percentage points higher than their paid labor
force participation rates and therefore higher than participation rates in 1940 (Goldin 1990: 44).
In Britain, there is evidence of a decline in wives’ and daughters’ contributions to household
incomes between 1790 and 1865, coinciding with the commercialization of agriculture and the
9decline of outwork activities (Humphries and Horrocks 1995). Revised estimates of the census
ﬁgures for England and Wales that account for women’s roles as unpaid workers show that
participation rates declined between 1851 and 1891 (Higgs 1987). The enumeration of unpaid
family workers in the French census of 1851 implies that women’s participation fell with the
contraction of agriculture beween 1850 and 1950 (Grantham and Grimard 1999). If we go back
even further in time, women’s participation may have more of an N-shape. De Vries (1994) and
Voth (1998) argue that prior to the industrial revolution, there was an “industrious revolution”
because the increased availability of consumer goods led both men and women to increase their
hours of work.
1.2 Women’s Work
In understanding the increase in married women’s work for pay outside of the home, the concept
of cohort matters. Cohorts differ in terms of their education and wealth, their fertility, their
accumulation of labor market experience, and their socialization experiences when young. In
the United States labor force participation rates among women in their 40s increased sharply
beginning with the cohort born between 1906 and 1915. Among women in their 20s and 30s
labor force participation rates have been increasing for all cohorts born since the 1940s (Goldin
1990: 21-23). In the following paragraphs I will therefore describe the experiences of American
women who worked before 1890, between 1890 and 1940, 1940 and 1970, and after 1970,
drawing heavily upon Goldin (1990).
At the beginning of the nineteenth century when the United States was still a heavily
agricultural nation, wives and daughters of farmers who were economically active were most
likely to be unpaid workers on the family farm. Industrialization divided the workplace and the
home and decreased the economic activity of married women. It increased the participation of
young,singlewomenin paid laborpriorto1850 becausethespread ofnewlarge-scalemethodsof
10production facilitated the substitution of unskilled for skilled labor. Farmers’ daughters ﬂocked
to the newly established mill towns where they earned higher wages than as servants and worked
shorterhours. IntheNortheastin1820approximately9percentofworkersinmanufacturingwere
women. This ﬁgure reached a peak of 33 percent in 1832 before falling (Goldin and Sokoloff
1982).
The mill town declined as industry became progressively urbanized. Whereas the mill
girls worked at factories built at water sites and some even lived in boarding houses built by
factory owners, the working girl of the second half of the nineteenth century was more likely to
live at home and to give more of her earnings to her family. Beginning in the 1840s, working
women were more likely to be immigrants and hours, wages, and conditions of work probably
worsened.
The rise of the clerical sector transformed women’s work. At the end of the nineteenth
century most working women were employed in either the service or the manufacturing sector
and most men were employed in either agriculture or manufacturing (see Table 2). By 1930, the
service,clerical,andmanufacturingsectorshadbecomethemostimportantsectorsofemployment
for women, whereas manufacturing and agriculture remained so for men. Women also entered
into the professions, particularly teaching.
Women entered the clerical sector because new technology allowed ﬁrms to replace
skilled labor with the labor of women who had taken stenography or typing courses but who
had little on the job training. At the end of the nineteenth century clerks and secretaries were
trusted employees familiar with the entire operations of the ﬁrm. They were also employees who
could be promoted to head. As ﬁrm size increased, as accounting departments within ﬁrms grew,
and as departments run by middle managers were created, demand for clerical staff increased.
The division of labor and specialization increased because the typewriter and other machines,
including those for bookkeeping, accounting, and duplicating, allowed ﬁrms to hire workerswho
11Table 2: Occupational Distributional, 1890-1999
1890/1900 1930 1970 1999
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Professional 10.2% 9.6% 13.6% 16.5% 24.9% 18.9% 31.5% 35.9%
Clerical 2.8 4.0 5.5 20.9 7.6 34.5 5.5 23.4
Sales 4.6 4.3 6.1 6.8 6.8 7.4 11.3 13.0
Manufacturing 37.6 27.7 45.2 19.8 48.1 17.9 37.9 9.2
Service 3.1 35.5 4.8 27.5 8.2 20.5 9.9 17.4
Agricultural 41.7 19.0 24.8 8.4 4.5 0.8 3.8 1.1
The ﬁgures for 1890/1900-1970 are from Goldin (1990: 64). Those for 1999 are from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics web site.
had either attended commercial schools or taken commercial classes in high school and to put
them to work with very little on the job training. These workerswere women because the growth
in high school education between the 1890s and the 1940s provided them with the necessary
general skills. The clerical sector provided them with better pay and cleaner, less arduous work
than manufacturing. But, because women were expected to leave the labor force upon marriage
they worked at jobs from which they were never promoted whereas men could rise from ofﬁce
boy to president of the company. It is therefore in this sector that we ﬁrst observe substantial
wage discrimination (Goldin 1990: 110-117).
The clerical sector transformed the work of married women. Female manufacturing
workers were heavily penalized for changes in occupation and ﬁrm, retaining only 20 percent
of their experience related increase in earnings. Women in the clerical sector kept more than
60 percent (Goldin 1990: 108). Women in the clerical sector could therefore leave the labor
force when their ﬁrst child was born and then re-enter the labor force when their children were of
school age without paying a heavy penalty for time spent out of the labor force. Members of the
cohort born between 1906 and 1915 were among the ﬁrst to follow this pattern of exit when their
children were young and re-entry when they were in their 40s. By 1970 35 percent of all working
12women were in the clerical sector, compared to 8 percent of men (see Table 2). This sector drew
not only from the ranks of high school graduates, but also from those of college graduates.
The emergence of part-time work after 1950 altered the paid work opportunities of
married women. A working woman in 1890 was faced with an average work day of 9.5 hours
(e.g. Costa 2000), six days a week. The length of the work day was rigid, with penalties for
tardiness (Atack and Bateman 1992). Only outwork,with its lowpay, or boardinghouse keeping,
withitsrequirementofhomeownership,providedopportunitiesforpart-timework. Thischanged
after 1950 when ﬁrms were faced with a declining supply of young, unmarried female workers
because of increases in school attendance, declines in age at ﬁrst marriage, and the baby boom.
Firmssought to accommodate theworkschedule demands of marriedwomen (Goldin1990: 175,
181). Muchofthegrowthinwomen’semploymentbetween1950and1970consisted ofgrowthin
part-timework. In 1950 23 percent of all working married women in couples whereboth spouses
were between ages 25 to 39 were working fewer than 35 hours a week. By 1970 this proportion
was 35 percent and in 1998 was still a high 33 percent.4 In Britain the increase in women’s
part-time employment between 1950 and 1970 was even larger (Joshi, Layard, and Owen 1985).
The proportion of women working part-time is now greater in Britain than in the United States
(40 percent versus 20 percent working less than 30 hours aweek in 1997), whereasthe proportion
of men working part-time is the same (8 percent working less than 30 hours a week in 1997).5
Since 1970 women have begun to enter careers in large numbers. The college educated
women who graduated in the 1950s majored in such ﬁelds as education and nursing where few
men got degrees and upon graduation weretracked into traditionallyfemale sectors, regardless of
their majors. They left the labor force when their ﬁrst child was born and only re-entered when
4Estimated from the integrated public use census samples (Ruggles and Sobeck 1998) and the 1998 Current
PopulationSurvey.
5The proportionsworking part-time are from the OECD website.
13all children were in school. Goldin (1997) characterizes their experience as “family then job.”
The cohorts who graduated 20 years later, aspired to “career then family” or “career and family”
(Goldin 1997). Their college majors and their graduate degrees became more similar to those of
men. In 1970 only 10 percent of undergraduate economics degrees were awarded to women, but
by1996theﬁgurewas30percent. Thefractionofeconomicsdoctoraldegreesthatwenttowomen
rose from 5 to 22 percent between these years. The increase in the proportion of professional
degrees awarded to women was even sharper. In 1970 6 percent of all ﬁrst-professional degrees
awarded in health went to women but by 1996 the ﬁgure was 43 percent (National Science
Foundation 1999). Women are now more likely to be in non-traditional professions. Whereas
in 1970 only 10 percent of all physicians were women, by 1998 29 percent were.6 At 43 of the
top economics departments in 1972, 9 percent of the assistant professors were women, 4 percent
of the associate professors, and 2 percent of the full professors. At the same schools in 1997
22 percent of the assistant professors were women, 13 percent of the associate professors, and 6
percent of the full professors (Bartlett 1998).
Table3illustratestrendsinmarriedwomen’slaborforceparticipationratesandpart-time
work since 1940 by examining their participation rates by their own and their spouse’s education.
Since 1960 labor force participation rates have increased more sharply among college educated
women married to college educated men than among high school educated women married to
high school educated men.7 Wives’ labor force participation rates also increased sharply among
couples in which only one spouse had a college education because the proportion of couples
in which the wife was college educated rose from 27 percent in 1940 to 50 percent in 1998.
In 1960 and 1970, when most college educated women entered either non-professional jobs in
6Estimated from the integrated public use census sample (Ruggles and Sobek 1997) and the BLS web site.
7This phenomenon of increasing participationamong women married to high wage men was ﬁrst pointed out by
Juhn and Murphy (1997). It is also observed in Britain and in France (e.g. Dex, Walters, and Alden 1993).
14Table 3: Participation Rates and Part-timeWork Among Married American Women by Own and
Husband’s Education
1940 1960 1970 1980 1990 1998
Wife’s labor force participation
Both spouses college educated 19.7% 28.1% 40.8% 63.8% 72.9% 76.7%
Only one spouse college educated 18.4 22.2 33.1 56.8 70.3 78.2
Neither spouse college educated 16.7 27.3 36.7 52.5 64.8 69.3
Couples in which wife works:
% wives working part-time
Both spouses college educated 26.7% 36.7% 39.4% 30.6% 28.3% 33.4%
Only one spouse college educated 22.0 33.3 38.5 33.1 29.7 30.1
Neither spouse college educated 23.0 29.8 33.7 31.4 29.9 33.8
The data consist of matched couples where both spouses are between ages 25-39. The ﬁgures for 1940-1990
were estimated from the integrated public use census samples (Ruggles and Sobek 1997). The 1950 census
provides informationon the education of onlyone spouse. The 1998ﬁgures were estimated from the Current
PopulationSurvey (UnitedStates Department ofCommerce 1998). Populationweightsare used for1940and
1990. Part-time work is deﬁned as less than 35 hours per week.
the clerical or sales sector or traditional professional jobs (such as that of nurse, schoolteacher,
librarian, or social worker) part-time work was more common among college educated women
marriedto college educated men than among high school educated women marriedto high school
educated men. After 1970, when college education became increasingly associated with careers,
the proportion of wives working part-time no longer varied by own and spouse’s education. The
fraction of wives (and also of husbands) working part-time increased between 1990 and 1998.
1.3 International Trends Since 1960
How unique is the recent American story of rising women’s labor force participation rates?
Australia, Canada, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom all experienced sizable
increases in aggregate labor force participation rates since 1960 because the participation of
married women rose. In Sweden participation rates fell beginning with the recession of the early
151990s, but the percentage point decline was the same for men as for women. The French increase
in aggregate participation rates since 1960 was smaller than that observed in Australia, Canada,
Sweden,theNetherlands,andtheUnitedKingdom,butwashigherthanthat inGermany(oncethe
rise in participation rates with uniﬁcation is excluded) or Italy (see Figures3 and 4). In these two
countries,theparticipationrateofmarriedwomenbarelychanged. InItaly,women’sparticipation
ratesfellasthesize oftheagriculturalsectordeclined andthen roseaswomen’seducational levels
rose and as the service sector and manufacturing industries that employed women became more
important (del Boca 1988).
With the exception of Japan, the labor force participation rates observed in Figures 3
and 4 are good indicators of women’s participation in the paid, formal sector. In Japan women’s
participation rates have been relatively high because a large fraction of the female labor force
(21 percent in 1984 compared to 1 percent in the United States) consists of family workers (Hill
1988). Japanese participation rates are now lower than they were in 1960 because of the decline
of family enterprises.
Several factorsaccount for differencesin women’spaid participation rates across coun-
tries. In Japan, discrimination and social norms have hindered the movement of married women
into paid labor. In contrast, Sweden has both actively encouraged paid female labor force par-
ticipation and promoted pronatalism since the 1930s. Swedish taxation provides substantial
incentives to be a dual earner couple whereas taxation in Germany penalizes dual-earner couples
and taxation in the Netherlands penalized dual earner couples until 1990 and is now neutral
(Gustafsson and Bruyn-Hundt1991). Subsidized child careinSweden reducesthenegativeeffect
of children on women’s earnings (Gustafsson and Stafford 1992). In Germany pronatalism has
taken the form of child allowances paid to the parent who has no income or who works less than
20 hours a week (Vogelheim 1988). It has also taken the form of paid, parental leave of up to
three years duration. In addition, the dominance of the manufacturing sector and of tool-making
16Figure 3: Labor Force Participation Rates in North America, Australia, and Japan, 1960-1998
Note. Rates are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics web site and were adjusted by the Bureau to be comparable to
the theAmerican concepts ofthe laborforce, except inthe treatmentof age cutoffsand oflayoffs. The US data relate
to the population older than 15. The Canadian, Australian, and Japanese data relate to the populationolder than 14.
The data are for theciviliannoninstutionalizedworkingage population,except for Japan, where theinstitutionalized
workingpopulationis included.
17Figure 4: Labor Force Participation Rates in Selected European Countries and the United States,
1960-1998
Note. Rates are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics web site and were adjusted by the Bureau to be comparable
to the the American concepts of the labor force, except in the treatment of age cutoffs and of layoffs. The French,
German, and Swedish data relateto the populationolder than 15. The Britishdata relate to thepopulationolder than
14 prior to 1972 and older than 15 thereafter. The Dutch data relate to the populationolder than 13 before 1975 and
older than 14 thereafter. Italian data relate to the population older than 13 before 1992 and older than 14 thereafter.
The Swedish statistics were adjusted to include persons older than the upper age limit. The data are for the civilian
noninstutionalized working age population, except for Germany, where the institutionalized working population is
included. Beginning in 1991 the German data are for a uniﬁed Germany. The French and British ﬁgures differ from
those presented in Figure 2 because of differences in the labor force concept.
18and machine-building, in particular, has decreased demand for female labor in Germany (Erler
1988). Low Italian participation rates (as low as those observed in Spain and Greece) may arise
from undercounting women in the informal sector or from the high costs to employers of part-
time work (determined by legislation and by union contracts) and the heavy expectations placed
upon mothers combined with little support (del Boca 1988). Additional explanations for the low
female labor force participation rates observed in some countries include relatively low wages
for women (the difference between male and female earnings in 1997 was highest in Japan at
40 percent and lowest in Sweden and France at less than 20 percent); high unemployment rates
(rates that on the Continent are higher for women than for men); laws regulating store hours;




The Netherlandshad thehighest percentageof women workingless than 30 hours aweek in 1997
(55percent) followedbytheUnited Kingdomand Australia(40percent each). The United States,
Italy, and Sweden had the lowest (20, 24, and 25 percent).9 The types of jobs held by women
also vary widely. Occupational segregation is higher in the Nordic countries than in other OECD
countries. (It is lowest in the United States (Anker 1998: 176).) In the Nordic countries women
are mainly employed in education, health care, child day care, and social services, all of which
are monopolized by the state. In these countries the public sector accounted for 58 percent of
total female employment in 1992 (Melkas and Anker 1998). Women’s share of administrative
8For relative wages and high unemployment rates by sex see the OECD web site, OECD in Figures, 1999.
9Part-time statistics are available from the OECD web site (OECD in Figures, 1999). Among men the highest
part-time rates in 1997 were in Australia, Japan, and the Netherlands (14, 13, and 11 percent, respectively) and the
lowest in Germany, Italy, and France (3, 5, and 6 percent respectively).
19and managerialjobsin 1994-1995(jobsthatrangefromthechiefexecutive ofamajorcorporation
to the manager of a local fast food store) was 43 percent in the United States and Australia, 28
percent in Sweden, and 9 percent in Japan (International Labour Organization 1997: 15).
Whether women have achieved positions of power differs across countries and differs
depending upon whether one examines the public or private sector. In the Nordic countries
women play the largest role in government. In Sweden women held 30 percent of ministerial
level positions in 1994 compared to 16 percent in Germany, 12 percent in Italy, 9 percent in the
United Kingdom, and 7 percent in France(InternationalLabor Organization1997: 28). Positions
of power in the Nordic countries do not translate into positions of power in the privatesector. For
example, in 1990 in Finland women held 39 percent of all seats in parliament, but only 6 percent
of all board seats of the 100 largest private ﬁrms (International Labour Organization 1997: 27).
Although comparisons of women’ssuccess in business are harder to make across coun-
tries, the available data suggest that women in the United States fare relatively well. The number
of chief executives who are women is tiny in all countries. But, a comparison of the boards of
major corporations shows that women hold more seats in the United States than in Canada or
the United Kingdom. In the United States in 1999 and in 1998 women held 11 percent of all
board seats of the ﬁrst 500 companies of the Fortune 1000 and in 1999 9 percent of the seats of
the next 500 companies. In contrast, in Canada women held only 6 percent of the board seats of
the Financial Post 500 in 1998.10 In the United Kingdom a 1995 survey of over 300 enterprises
reported that 3 percent of board members were women (International Labor Organization 1997:
20). Another survey that examined Times 200 companies plus a number of leading Building
Societies reported that 6 percent of board members were women (McRae 1996). During these
same years in the United States 9 percent of all board seats of the Fortune 500 were held by
10Findings are from 1999 Catalyst Census of Women Board Directors of Fortune 1000 and Catalyst Census of
Women Board Directors of Canada. Excerpts can be found on the Catalyst web site.
20women.11
2 The Participation of Married Women
The increase in married American women’s work for pay outside of the home in the second half
of the twentieth century represents a dramaticbreak with women’s past experience. Why did this
change occur? On the supply side more women may have been willing to enter the labor market
because they were having fewer children (though better job opportunities may have helped lower
fertility rates); because their time spent producing such household goods as food or cleanliness
was falling thanks to new household technologies such as washing machines, cleaner lighting,
and vacuum cleaners and to prepared foods; because their conditions, hours, and status of work
were improving; and because their preferences for work may have changed. On the demand side
ﬁrms may have been more willing to hire women because of the rise of the clerical and sales
sector; the development of technologies that allowed ﬁrms to substitute the labor of women for
that of men; the growth of formal education that could replace on the job training; and changes
in the tastes of employers and their male employees or reduced discrimination. Provided that we
know women’s income and substitution elasticities, we can determine whether demand or supply
factors were more important in increasing married women’s participation.12
Numerouscross-city studiesprovideuswithevidenceon laborsupplywageandincome
elasticities for marriedwomenover the course of the entiretwentiethcentury.13 For the ﬁrst three
decadesofthetwentiethcentury,marriedwomen’suncompensatedwageelasticitiesoflaborforce
11See the Catalyst web site. Numbers are for 1994.
12See Goldin (1990: 119-158) for a more formal framework.
13These studies are listed in Goldin (1990: 132). Although cross-city studies are not the ideal way to estimate
women’s labor supply elasticities, they offer the only consistent way of doing so for the whole century.
21participation were equal to 0. Their income elasticities of labor force participation were large
(substantially greater than one) and negative and their compensated wage elasticities were small.
At mid-century women’s labor supply parameters were very different. Their uncompensated
wage elasticities were quite high (up to 1.5 in some studies). Their income elasticities fell below
one and their compensated wage elasticities may have been as large as 2. In the ﬁnal decades of
the twentiethcentury, women’s wageelasticities wereagain very different. Their uncompensated
wage elasticities were smaller (though not as small as 0), as were their income elasticities. Their
compensated wage elasticities had fallen to around 0.5.
Goldin (1990: 133-135) provides an explanation for why income elasticities fell for
the entire century and why wage elasticities ﬁrst rose and then fell. Recall that in 1900 most
womenwereemployedineitherservice,manufacturing,oragriculturaloccupations. Theworking
conditions in these occupations were poor and the hours long. A working wife implied that the
household was in ﬁnancial crisis, either because the husband was too poor to adequately provide
for his wife, was unemployed, or ill. Income effects were large and substitution effects small
because theonly women in thelabor forcewere those pushed in because their husbands’ incomes
were low. By 1950 the rise of the clerical sector, with its better conditions of labor, and the
entry of college educated women into the clerical sector reduced the negative signal to a wife’s
working. Now a woman might be working because her value of time was high. Because of the
reduced stigma to working, the income effect weakened and the substitution effect rose. The
increased availability of market goods that could substitute for homegoods weakened theincome
effect even further. After mid-century, the increase in divorce rates (which made a husband’s
income undependable), the increased status and meaning found in work, and the increased cost
of intermittancy in the labor market made women’s labor force experiences more like those men
and reduced both the income and substitution effect.
Goldin (1990: 136-138) uses the estimated wage and income labor force participation
22elasticities to conclude that supply explains virtually all of the increase in married women’s
participationbetween 1890 and 1930 and that demand explains almost all of theincrease between
1940and1960andthat demandandsupplysharetheincreasebetween 1960and1980. Sheargues
that the rise in women’s labor force participation rates depended upon both contemporaneous
changes in demand factors and upon the changing responsiveness of women’s labor supply. She
also points outthat this responsiveness wasacharacteristicof speciﬁccohortsand depended upon
their fertility, education, occupations, and expectations.
The importance of cohort effects suggests that change in women’s labor force partici-
pation rates may be slow because it must await the movement of cohorts, with their different set
of expectations and characteristics, through time. The increase in participation for cohorts born
around the turn of the century is connected to their particularly sharp fertility declines. These
cohorts also beneﬁted from the expansion of high school education from 1900 to 1930. Because
they had relatively high participation rates in the clerical sector when single, re-entry into the
labor force when they were in their 40s was easier. Of course, in retrospect, these cohorts may
have underinvested in on the job training and in formal schooling. Because they could use only
the experience of their mothers and grandmothers as a guide, they could not have predicted their
re-entry into the labor force when their children were grown (Goldin 1990: 138-157). Change
will therefore take time because expectations need to adjust.
Change in women’sparticipationmay also be slowbecause cohortsdifferin their social
norms regarding work and family. Eight-two percent of Americans (both male and female) told
pollsters in 1936 that a married woman should not earn money if her husband was capable of
supporting her.14 Seventy-three percent of married women of child-bearing age in 1970 agreed
that preschool children suffered if the mother works. By 1977 the ﬁgure was 58 percent and by
14Gallop poll of November 15, 1936.
231985 37 percent. In 1991 the ﬁgure was 34 percent (Rindfuss, Brewster, and Kavee 1996).
Finally, change in women’s labor force participation may also be slow because of
discrimination. This discrimination was institutionalized in the marriage bars in school districts
and in ﬁrms that in the United States and in Britain prohibited the employment of married
women. Demographic change that reduced the supply of young female employees led to the
disappearance of the marriage bar (Goldin 1990: 160-179). Discrimination also affected the
willingness of employees to work with women and the willingness of employers to hire women.
Such discrimination is extremely difﬁcult to prove, but a unique study of the adoption of “blind”
auditions by orchestras with a “screen” to conceal the identity of the candidate from the jury
suggests that the use of more impartial hiring procedures increased by 25 percent the percentage
of women in orchestras from 1970 to 1996 (Goldin and Rouse, forthcoming). Pressure from the
feminist movement and anti-discrimination policy, such as investigations in the United States of
employment discrimination charges by sex in the early 1970s under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and of discrimination in admissions to graduate and professional schools under Title
IX of the Civil Rights Act, may therefore have played a role in increasing women’s labor force
participation.
Goldin’s (1990: 135) work has emphasized that, relative to the past, married women’s
wage and income elasticities of labor force participation in the 1960s and 1970s were small and
became more similar to those of men. There have been changes since the 1960s as well. From
the 1960s to the end of the 1980s the relationship between wife’s employment and husband’s
earnings has grown weaker while the relationship between wife’s employment and her wages
has grown stronger, though it is still small (Juhn and Murphy 1987). Examining the 1975-1994
period, Pencavel (1998) ﬁnds that increases in own wages account for about one quarter of the
increased employmentof women at younger ages and about half of the increase in employmentat
older ages. He concludes that market work has become relatively more hospitable and household
24activity less attractive to women beyond that summarized in movements in wages.
The relatively small size of married women’s wage and income elasticities suggests
that those women who are out of the labor force today may very well have a very strong taste
for remaining at home. Unless these tastes change the labor force participation rates of married
women may not increase much above their current rate of 62 percent.
3 Future Generations
The entryof womeninto non-traditionalcareershas had thebiggest impact on theireconomicand
socialstatus. Theearly1970swereaturningpointinwomen’sentryintograduateandprofessional
schools. In 1970 only 9 percent of all applicants to medical school were women but by 1976 24
percent were and by the end of the 1990s 43 percent. The fraction of women in entering classes
mirroredthischangeintheapplicantpool(AmericanMedicalAssociation). Trendsinlawschools
were similar. In 1970 only 10 percent of all ﬁrst year law school students were women but by
1976 28 percent were and by the end of the 1990s almost 50 percent (American Bar Assocation).
The history of how women entered the professions is still being written. Goldin and Katz (2000)
argue that the availability of the birth control pill allowed women to delay marriage and embark
on a lengthy professional education. The availability of legal abortion may have assisted. On the
demand side the passage of Title IX in 1972 applied Civil Rights legislation to universities and
may have exerted direct pressure on graduate and professional school admissions committees.
The increasing proportion of women graduating from professional and graduate pro-
grams suggests that their entry into non-traditionalcareers will continue. Many, however, believe
that there is a glass ceiling limiting the advance of women to the highest professional levels.
Among Phd economists who enter tenure track positions in academia women have a harder time
achieving tenure and take longer achieving it, controlling for the quality of the institution they
25received their Phd from, among other things (Kahn 1993). While both college men and women
majoring in business believe that that they will start with the same salaries, women anticipate
lower earnings in subsequent years (Blau and Ferber 1991). These expectations are matched by
the experience of previous cohorts. Among individuals who received their MBAs between 1975
and 1980 there were no gender differences initiallly in income but 6 years later the women were
earning 9 percent less than the men (Schneer and Reitman 1995; see also Stroh, Brett, and Reilly
1992). In both 1973 and 1978 Fortune reported that only 0.2 percent of the highest paid ofﬁcers
and directors in the top 1,000 industrial and 300 service companies were women (Robertson
1978). This fraction was still small in 1990 when Fortune reported that 0.5 percent of the highest
paid ofﬁcers and directors of the top 799 companies on its combined lists of the 1,000 largest
industrial and service companies were women (Fierman 1990). And this fraction was still small
in 1995 and in 1999, when women held 1.2 and 3.3 percent, respectively, of the top-earner spots
in the Fortune 500.15
The difﬁculty of combining career and family partially explains the slow advancement
of women into positions of power. Career advancement may require relocation and frequent
travel and that is difﬁcultwhen both spouses have careers. Higher earnerstoday workmorehours
than low earners (Costa 2000; Coleman and Pencavel 1993a, 1993b). Managers in Fortune 500
companies work an average of 56 hours a week (Brett and Stroh 1999). There is no job sharing
or part-time work at the top, so time with children may be squeezed. Goldin (1997) ﬁnds that
among college educated women who were age 34 to 44 in 1988 only 13 percent achieved career
and family,where a woman was said to have achieved a career if in 1985, 1987, and 1988 she had
hourlyearnings exceeding that of the25th percentileof collegeeducated men. Among executives
(vice-president level and above) surveyed circa 1990 37 percent of the women were childless
15See the 1995and 1999CatalystCensus of Women Corporate Ofﬁcers and Top Earners on the Catalyst web site.
26compared to 5 percent of the men.16
The signiﬁcant negative impact on earnings and promotions of taking time off from
worktocare for childrenis well documented. Nonetheless, many womenstill do taketimeoff. A
study of University of Michigan Law School graduates concludes that even among lawyers who
have invested heavily in their careers, women are more willing than men to sacriﬁce wages and
promotions for the joys of parenting (Wood, Corcoran, and Courant 1993).
Women’s prospects of combining career and family are improving, but they still face
a difﬁcult task. Their continued progress in careers may well depend upon men’s willingness to
share child rearing responsibilities. Although the gender gap in housework has narrowed since
the 1960s both in the United States and in the United Kingdom (it is narrower in the United
States where women spend less time in domestic work and men spend more time shopping),
even women who work still disproportionately bear the brunt of domestic chores (Gershuny and
Robinson 1988; Blau 1998). Among dual career households men are somewhat more likely than
women (58 versus 49 percent) to classify their careers as equal, but they are also more likely than
women to say their own careers are primary (33 versus 6 percent).17 Although the fraction of
femaleexecutives who are childless fell from61 to 37 percent between 1982 and 1992, morethan
a third is still a high number.18
Not all of the glass ceiling phenomenon is attributable to children. Among Michigan
law schoolgraduateswomenearned61percentasmuchasmen15yearsaftergraduationandeven
controlling for child care, work history, labor supply, school performance, and job settings, one
quarterofthegapinmaleandfemalesalarieswasstillunexplained. Whetherthisunexplainedgap
16Korn/Ferry International and UCLA Anderson Graduate School of Management, Decade of the Executive
Woman, 1993. Cited in Weeks (1993).
17See Two Careers, One Marriage on the Catalyst web site.
18Korn/Ferry International and UCLA Anderson Graduate School of Management, Decade of the Executive
Woman, 1993. Cited in Weeks (1993).
27was due to statistical or taste discrimination was unclear (Wood, Corcoran, and Courant 1993).
As more women successfully combine career and family and as the attitudes of employers, co-
workers,andhusbands changediscriminationis likelyto fall. Certainly, perceiveddiscrimination
has fallen. In 1982 39 percent of female executives considered sexism the biggest obstacle to
achieving success. By 1992 this ﬁgure was down to 27 percent.19
4 Conclusion
Since 1950 there has been an unprecedented increase in the participation of married women in
paid labor in the United States. Between 1950 and 1998 their participation rates rose from 22
to 62 percent, with the largest increases between 1950 and 1980. Their increased participation
depended in part upon contemporaneous changes in demand for the labor of married women
because of the rise of the clerical sector. It also depended upon the labor supply responsiveness
of different cohorts of women, a responsiveness that in turn was determined by cohorts’ fertility,
education, expectations, and social norms regarding work and family. Finally, the increase in
women’s labor force participation also depended upon the decline of institutionalized and overt
discrimination.
The early rise in married women’s participation rates coincided with their entry into
the clerical sector and into part-time work. Although many women still disproportionately work
part-timeorintraditionallyfemalejobs, women’sentryintotheclerical sector andpart-timework
has now slowed and the biggest change in women’s work has been their entry into careers.
Women have made tremendous career strides within a generation. In 1960 only 7
percent of all lawyers and judges were women and 9 percent of all physicians. In 1970 these
19Korn/Ferry International and UCLA Anderson Graduate School of Management, Decade of the Executive
Woman, 1993. Cited in Weeks (1993).
28ﬁgures were still similar but by 1998 they were 29 and 26 percent, respectively.20 But, despite
their breakthroughsin the professions and in management, women are only slowly moving to the
top. Women lawyers, physicians, and managers earn less than men. In 1999 women held only
3 percent of the top-earner spots in the Fortune 500. Nor are women currently well-positioned
to break through to the top. In 1999 women corporate ofﬁcers held only 28 percent of line jobs
(postswithproﬁt-and-lossordirectclientresponsibility)comparedto50percentofmencorporate
ofﬁcers.21
The difﬁculty of combining work and family has slowed women’s move to the top.
More womenthan menare willingto sacriﬁce their careers for timespent with childrenand those
women who reach the top are disproportionately childless. This has led to calls for more family
friendly policies, such as generous parental leave. But, an overly generous policy may raise
the employment of women at the cost of lower relative wages and career advancement (Ruhm
1998). History suggests that changes in women’slabor forceexperience can be frustatingly slow.
Progress may have to wait for the entry of new cohorts of women, with different characteristics
and expectations, into the labor market. It may also have to wait for the entry of new cohorts of
men with different expectations regarding work and family into the labor market.
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